SENSE · CONTROL · LINK · RECOVER · SYNC

Technology is five chains that must all hold

A confined-network inspection robot cannot optimise only one module. If sensing, flight control, communications, recovery or data sync breaks, the field does not get evidence. It gets a new unknown.

This page writes subsystems as testable objects. Each has a failure mode, a rig method and a public-statement limit. Target numbers live on the specs page, all labelled unverified. Methods come from papers and product teardowns on the learning centre. External figures are not written as our own results.

The five chains are jointly testable. Sensing without a degradation alarm still produces a clip nobody can place. A recoverable vehicle without time-aligned gas is a photograph, not a permit input. Software versions separately so a release can name what changed, what was tested, and which public sentences remain forbidden. GNSS-denied localisation must carry a degradation alarm. Unaligned video, gas and pose cannot enter a defect conclusion. Corridor parameters stay in the target column until a matching evidence gate closes. Field application exists. Concept, laboratory and field stay distinct. This page is not a production photograph.

SENSE

Sensing: three physical quantities, separately

Visible / night vision answers “what is on the surface”. Thermal answers “where is the temperature difference”. Gas sensors answer “is the target gas present”. Depth / LiDAR answers geometry. Fusion only supplies context. Low-light enhancement must not overwrite the raw image. The gas sample port must account for rotor wash and the wall boundary layer. Mixing those quantities into one present-tense detection-rate sentence conflicts with the evidence page.

CONTROL

Flight control: stability below the job, abort above autonomy

First edition: human supervision plus assistive stability. Attitude, height / pipe-axis hold and wall-follow are separate modes, not a default full-autonomy explore. Localisation confidence drop, gas threshold, low battery and loss of link can all interrupt. GNSS is unavailable in pipe. Localisation must carry a degradation alarm. The 0.2–3 m wall-hold figure is a control-mode target on the specs page. It is not a verified centimetre claim.

LINK

Communications: a weak link must be visible

Underground bends and standing water can collapse radio quality. PG-RELAY starts with tethered / wired backup and a few recoverable nodes, records RSSI / loss / delay, and marks last-heard position. This site does not promise a full underground mesh. Tethered products such as ScoutDI show that a physical recovery path is part of the comms architecture. That architecture contrast is a classroom, not a PipeGuardian field result.

RECOVER

Recovery: a design input, not after-sales

A grabbable cage, orientation fool-proofing, well-head guidance, emergency power cut, battery isolation after impact. Kit that cannot be recovered is a new hazard in a confined space. The dock handles power, unload, inspection and decontamination so a job can repeat, instead of improvising cables each time. Recovery belongs on the safety bounds page as a permit input, not a brochure afterthought.

SYNC

Data sync: unaligned data is not evidence

Video, point cloud, gas, attitude, link quality and operator input must share a timeline and a segment index. PG-Atlas keeps model version, confidence, human edits and raw-file hashes. Failed alignment stays a reference. It does not enter a defect conclusion. Atlas aims to map Shenzhen underground-line coding, not a private format that cannot join an owner ledger.

SOFTWARE STACK

Software layers, so the whole vehicle stays testable

Flight control, mission management, perception and the asset platform version separately. A release must answer: what changed, what was tested, which statements remain forbidden.

Onboard

Realtime control, health monitoring, sensor drivers, local cache. Cache exists so some evidence can still come home after loss of link — not to pretend the vehicle is online. Onboard software does not advertise accuracy. It records what the vehicle can still prove after an interrupt.

Well-head

Mission card, takeover, link watch, unload and equipment checklist. Well-head software is a safety control surface. A topside operator who cannot see a weak link, or cannot abort, is not supervising a confined-space job.

Atlas

Segment objects, work orders, review, reports and interfaces. The aim is to map Shenzhen underground-line coding, not a private format that cannot join. Unaligned files stay reference material. They do not close a defect.

Model governance

Train/test isolation, miss-case library, frozen versions. Models only rank suspicious clips. Until G4, do not advertise accuracy. G0–G6 dates are internal governance on the 18-month roadmap. They are not a customer or grant delivery promise.

Statement limit: this page carries no present-tense endurance, accuracy or detection-rate numbers. Those figures may appear only in the “target” column on the specs page, pointing at the matching evidence gate. Named vendors on this page are architecture contrast. They are not PipeGuardian field results.